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DEFECTIVE PROSTHETIC DEVICES: STRICT
TORT LIABILITY FOR THE HOSPITAL?
Hospitals which supply defective medical products--blood, medical instruments,
drugs-to patients in the course of treatment have tradition'lly been liable onlyfor
negligent administration of those products, notfor defects in the products themselves.
This Note examines whether a similar standard should inhere for hospitals which
supply defective prosthetic devices. With the increasing use and sophistication of
such devices, the issue will assume greater importance. The Model Uniform Product
LiabilityActprecludes strictproducts liability against hospitals except in limit edsitu-
ations. Because theprimaryfunction of a hospital is the supplying ofservices, not the
sale ofproducts, and because the supplying ofprosthetic devices is integrally linked
to professional medicaljudgment and opinion, this Note asserts that the UPL4 stan-
dard is the proper one, and should be used in defective prosthetic device litigatiol
INTRODUCTION
JUDICIAL RECOGNITION of a strict liability standard' for
injuries arising from defectively produced products is a rela-
tively recent development.2 Strict products liability extends to
manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers of defective products.'
Traditionally, however, hospitals and the medical profession have
been liable for negligent conduct only.'
1. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE LJ. 1099 (1960); Prosser, he Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
2. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 657 (4th ed. 1971)
(citing Greenman v. Yuma Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963) (first judicial decision to hold a manufacturer of a defective product strictly
liable for the resulting injuries)).
3. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 100, at 664-65 (4th ed. 1971). California has
been one of the more progressive states in applying strict liability. See Price v. Shell Oil
Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970) (bailors and lessors of personal
property); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1964) (retailer); Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970) (licensor of
chattels); McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446,79 Cal. Rptr. 337
(1969) (commercial lessors of property); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d
224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969) (housing developer); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265
Cal. App. 2d 228,71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968), modfied, 15 Cal. App. 3d 137,92 Cal. Rptr. 809
(1971) (wholesale and retail distributor).
4. See Rubin, Manufacturer and Professional User's Liabilityfor Defective Medical
Equpment, 8 AKRON L. REV. 99, 99-104 (1974); Note, Products and the Professional- Strict
Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 111, 120-32 (1972);
Note, The Medical Profession and Strict Liabilityfor Defective Products-A Limited Exten-
sion, 17 HASTINGS LJ. 359, 365-66 (1965).
Historically, hospitals were protected from all tort liability under the doctrine of chari-
table immunity. See D. WARREN, PROBLEMS IN HosPrriAL LAW 9 (3d ed. 1978). A loss of
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Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts5 imposes a
strict liability standard on "sellers" of defective products. Hospi-
tals and the medical profession, under a traditional common law
approach, are not considered to be product "sellers." Rather,
most courts reason that transactions between hospitals or mem-
bers of the medical profession and their patients are primarily
contracts for services. 6 These jurisdictions have held that inciden-
tal and secondary transfers of medical products and devices dur-
ing the performance of services do not qualify as sales.7
The service exception to strict products liability, however, is
not absolute. Some jurisdictions hold that if the service element is
of a routine, commercial nature and the sales aspect predomi-
nates, strict liability will attach.'
Other courts, however, have reasoned that a patient's contract
with a hospital is divisible into separate service and sales ele-
assets intended for charitable purposes was considered to be against public policy. Id.
With the present availability of liability insurance for charitable institutions, however,
nearly every state abandoned this doctrine,' recognizing that charitable institutions are obli-
gated to compensate injured persons. See id. Today nongovernmental hospitals, thus, are
liable for the acts of their employees operating within the scope of their employment.
Liability against governmental hospitals is somewhat uncertain. Federal hospitals face
limited liability under the Federal Torts Claims Act, and governmental immunity exists
only in approximately one-half of the states for officers, agents, and employees of state
.hospitals. Moreover, liability of county and municipal hospitals is determined by several
factors which vary by jurisdiction. Id. at 10-13.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id. A manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, or retailer is held strictly liable in tort, without
regard to fault, when an article is placed on the market which has not been inspected for a
defect, and which later proves to have an unreasonably dangerous defect which causes
injury. Defects usually arise in design, manufacturing, warning, or labeling. See W. PRos-
SER, supra note 2, § 99, at 659.
6. E.g., Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 104-06, 123 N.E.2d 792,
794-95 (1954); see also infra notes 56-85 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 56-71, 79-85 & 100-05 and accompanying text.
8. See Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (extending strict
liability to the commercial service area by holding a beauty operator strictly liable for a
defective product applied to a customer's hair). See generally supra note 3 and accompany-
ing text.
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ments, and that the hospital may be strictly liable for product de-
fects under the sales aspect.9 Moreover, a minority of jurisdictions
have spumed the sales/service distinction completely, determin-
ing the applicability of a strict products liability standard on an ad
hoc basis.'
The courts have not conclusively determined the applicability
of strict products liability standards to hospitals which supply de-
fective prosthetic devices." The drastic increase in the use, com-
plexity, and development of prosthetic devices' 2 will undoubtedly
result in greater numbers of injuries to patients, thus presenting
new questions concerning hospital liability.' 3 This Note examines
the possible application of a strict products liability standard to
9. See Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187
(1971); Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970);
Cheshire v. Southampton Hosp. Ass'n, 52 Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1967)
(mem.); see also infra notes 72-79, 86-102 & 118-24 and accompanying text. Transactions
involving both services and products are considered "hybrid" transactions. The
sales/service transaction has created difficulty for many courts in determining the applica-
bility of products liability. It is argued that a hybrid transaction occurs when a hospital
implants a prosthetic device since the patient receives both professional service and a
product.
10. See Johnson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973); see also
infra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
11. A prosthetic device is an artificial device used to replace a bodily part. Artificial
organs and devices are now used in virtually every aspect of human medicine. Examples
include devices which replace the breast, ureter, heart, lungs, kidneys, limbs, teeth, liver,
eyes, nose, and ears. Metcalf, Legal Problems in Medical Device Development, 44 INS.
COUNSEL J. 408 (1977). Dramatic advances in the development of electronic chips and
microprocessors have helped lead to the development of more advanced heart pacemakers
and effective new artificial limbs and organs. Examples of recent advances include artificial
hearts, electronic elbows, arms, knees, and ears and manmade blood and skin. See Fla-
herty,4 Delicate Legal Operation, NAT' L.J., Dec. 20, 1982, at 3, col. 1; Marbach, Building
the Bionic Man, NEWSWEEK, July 12, 1982, at 78-79; Kucheroy, More Spare Parts for the
Human Body, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 28, 1981/Jan. 4, 1982, at 76-77.
12. The variety of products offered for medical treatment increased exponentially in
the last twenty years as 2000 companies produced over 12,000 different devices totaling five
billion dollars in annual retail sales. Between 1960 and 1970, these devices caused an esti-
mated 10,000 injuries-including 731 deaths. Shaffer & Gordon, Clinical Engineering Lia-
bilit in the Hospital, 9 LAW. MED. J. 2d 273, 288-89 (1981).
13. It is possible that under certain circumstances a plaintiff injured by a defective
prosthetic device will seek recovery directly from the hospital. These circumstances are
present when jurisdictional problems preclude the plaintiffs chosen forum from exercising
jurisdiction over the manufacturer or, when the manufacturer is insolvent. See infra note
176 and accompanying text. Insolvency is a very real possibility since the medical device
industry is composed of many small companies dependent for survival on technology and
innovation. See Rogers, MedicalDevice Law-Intent and Implementation, 36 FOOD, DRUG
CosM. LU. 4, 7-8 (1981). Furthermore, if one of these small companies produced or
designed a defective device, the lawsuits arising from the defective product would quickly
render the company insolvent.
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hospitals supplying prosthetic devices' 4 by focusing on the
sales/service hybrid transaction and determining whether hospi-
tals should be classified as sellers of prosthetic devices or merely
as providers of services.' 5 Judicial decisions regarding blood
transfusions,' 6 medical instruments,' 7 drugs,' 8 and other prod-
ucts 9 will be analyzed and analogized to defective prosthetic
devices.
This Note examines the traditional policy rationales underly-
ing imposition of a strict products liability standard20 and con-
cludes that they do not support its application to hospitals in this
context. Moreover, the Note discusses the use by hospitals of the
defenses of assumption of the risk,2' product misuse,2 and the un-
avoidably unsafe product doctrine.2" The Note concludes by ex-
amining the Model Uniform Products Liability Act (UPLA) and
its application to the hospital supplying defective prostheses.24
I. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IMPOSING STRICT LIABILITY
Although it might appear inequitable to impose liability on an
individual who is not at fault in a traditional sense and who has
exercised all possible care, this is the end result of the doctrine of
strict products liability. Four policy rationales are utilized to jus-
tify imposition of a strict products liability standard. 5
14. This Note will examine only those injuries which are caused by implanted or at-
tached devices and does not discuss injuries caused by external machines and devices. In-
juries caused by implanted or attached prosthetic devices are arguably more susceptible to
a strict products liability standard than injuries caused by external machines. A prosthetic
device leaves the hospital's (retailer's) possession and is received by the patient (consumer).
This transfer of possession creates the implication that a sale has occurred. With external
devices there is no such transfer of property.
15. See infra notes 52-64, 71-102 & 111-24 and accompanying text. It is assumed that
an unreasonably dangerous defect or condition exists. Products liability exposure exists,
therefore, if the transaction is characterized as a sale and the hospital is deemed a seller of
the prosthetic device.
16. See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 100-11 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 112-24 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 151-65 and accompanying text.
25. For an examination of various policy rationales supporting strict products liabil-
ity, see Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-68, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); see also Comment, Dubin v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med-
ical Center: The Application of Strict Liability to Hospital-Supplied X-Radiation Treatments,
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The first policy rationale advanced is the "loss spreading" the-
ory, which advocates the spreading of costs associated with inju-
ries caused by defective products throughout the community,
rather than forcing the injured party to bear the entire loss. 26 The
product manufacturer or retailer is in a better position vis-a-vis
the consumer to spread the costs associated with defective prod-
ucts and resultant liability by either increasing the product's price
or purchasing liability insurance.27
This theory only supports imposition of a strict liability stan-
dard on a large hospital performing a substantial volume of sur-
gery involving a particular prosthetic device. A large hospital in
this situation would be in a position to spread compensation costs
by either raising its medical care costs or by purchasing additional
liability insurance. The smaller hospital, however, may have
neither sufficient patient volume nor sufficient income to spread
compensation costs to its patients.28 Moreover, an increase in the
present high cost of medical liability insurance would create a sig-
nificant burden for the smaller hospital.29 The validity of the loss
spreading theory, therefore, is primarily dependent on the size of
the hospital involved.
The second policy justification for imposition of a strict liabil-
ity standard is the "resource allocation" theory.30 Under this the-
ory the purchase price of a product should incorporate the cost of
compensation payments to consumers injured by the defective
product.31 The failure to internalize these costs in the product's
purchase price creates artificially low prices and overproduction.
Once product costs are internalized, the "true" cost of those prod-
ucts which cause injuries to consumers would be greater than
13 J. MAR. L. REV. 485, 500 (1980) (social policy now requires imposition of a products
liability standard on a seller of professional services who also transfers title to the goods).
26. See Franklin, Tort Liabilityforgepatitis: An Analysis anda Proposal, 24 STAN. L.
REv. 439, 463 (1972).
27. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
LJ. 499, 520 (1961).
28. A total of 47.17% of the 5830 community hospitals reporting to the 1980 Annual
Survey of the American Hospital Association had fewer than 100 beds, and the average
hospital size was only 169 beds. AMERICAN HosPrrAL AsSOCIATION, 1980 Annual Survey,
at xiv-xv (1981 ed.) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL SURVEY].
29. The average cost per inpatient day in community hospitals was $284.96 in 1980, a
14.1% increase over 1979. ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 28, at xviii. Thus, any increase in
a hospital's fixed costs, such as liability insurance premiums, would result in still higher
costs to its patients.
30. Franklin, supra note 26, at 463.
31. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718 (1965).
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those products which cause less injuries. The result would be in-
creased sales of the safer product and decreased sales of the dan-
gerous product. This shift in resources away from the more
dangerous product would therefore reduce the number of injuries,
since there would be economic inducement to purchase safer
products.3 z
Resource allocation theory assumes that the manufacturer is in
the best position to allocate compensation costs as a component of
the product's purchase price.33 When compensation costs are in-
ternalized at the manufacturer level, the "true" cost of a particular
product is accurately reflected. The manufacturer can internalize
cost through a slight price increase in all products it produces.
Hospitals, however, would be required to increase dramatically
the purchase price of the small number of products it supplies. In
other words, imposing compensation costs on hospitals creates ar-
tificially high product prices resulting in underproduction due to
decreased consumer demand. The hospital in this situation is
merely a product distributor, supplying a small, geographically
distinct market. The manufacturer, however, can allocate com-
pensation costs equally among all of the products it produces, cre-
ating a uniform product price. Resource allocation theory,
therefore, does not support the application of a strict liability stan-
dard on the hospital.
The third major policy rationale advanced is the "least cost
preventer theory," which states that the party with the greatest
control and knowledge of the product should bear ultimate re-
sponsibility for product defects.34 A party, realizing it will be held
strictly liable for injuries caused by its defective products, ideally
will exercise greater control over product production, thereby pro-
ducing a safer product. The least cost preventer theory imposes
liability on the party with the greatest control over the product
because corrective measures can be implemented with the least
cost. A prosthetic device manufacturer who exercises ultimate
control over product design, testing, and production fits within
this policy rationale. But a hospital, because of its overall lack of
control over prosthetic device production, is not a least cost
preventer.
It is conceivable that a hospital, if designated by the manufac-
32. See Franklin, supra note 26, at 463.
33. See Calabresi, supra note 27, at 506-07.
34. See Franklin, supra note 26, at 462 (citing Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)).
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turer as a distributor and authorized to adjust, inspect, or main-
tain the prosthetic device, would be in a least cost preventer
position.35 A hospital, however, could merely inventory the de-
vices prior to implantation without performing any significant in-
spection or maintenance functions. Moreover, some products may
have latent defects which are impossible to detect without disas-
sembly or sophisticated testing. Furthermore, the doctors or hospi-
tal employees responsible for product inspection arguably lack
sufficient mechanical or engineering knowledge to detect latent
design or construction defects. 36 Thus, latent defects in design or
material would not be apparent in a pre-operation inspection.37
Under the least cost preventer theory, therefore, unless the hospi-
tal has significant maintenance and inspection duties, there is in-
sufficient control and knowledge of the device to justify
imposition of strict liability.
A hospital may be in a position to exert indirect control over
product production by applying economic pressure on the manu-
facturer. If a manufacturer's product proves to be unreliable, the
hospital may threaten to switch product lines unless product safety
increases. This economic threat would force the manufacturer to
produce safer products. For some prosthetic devices, however,
there may be no alternative product. The hospital is then placed
in the difficult position of continuing to use the unreliable product
or to discontinue its use altogether.
The final policy justification for imposition of a strict liability
standard occurs when the defendant's complete control over and
knowledge of the product's production process makes it difficult
for the plaintiff to prove lack of due care.38 Liability is imputed
35. Since a hospital is liable for negligence in inspection, maintenance, or care of pros-
thetic devices within its control, imposing products liability arguably would have little or
no impact on this already high standard of care.
36. Mechanical failures of implants fall into three main categories: plastic failure,
brittle failure, and fatigue failure. R. Wirquist & V. Frankel, Complications of Implant
Use, in I COMPLICATIONS IN ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY 100 (G. Epps, Jr., ed. 1978). Detec-
tion of improper or defective plastics or metals used in implants would require sophisti-
cated testing of material stress capabilities.
37. When contemplating surgery the implanting surgeon should ask three questions:
(1) what kinematic function the implant must serve; (2) what is the expected load on the
implant; and (3) what is the expected life of the implant. Id. at 99. The implanting surgeon,
therefore, is primarily concerned with choosing the appropriate implant for the purpose
needed rather than detecting latent product defects.
38. See Franklin, supra note 26, at 461. The author asserts that the defendant's com-
plete control and expert knowledge of the production process can overcome the plaintiffs
initial advantage obtained under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur through a showing of the
defendant's due care. Id.
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upon the showing of a product defect and exclusive control by the
defendant over the production of the product. Strict liability is
imposed to avoid a wasteful trial with potentially erroneous re-
sults. 3 9 But the factual circumstances which result in imposition
of a strict liability standard upon a manufacturer are not applica-
ble to a hospital. The mere existence of a defect does not implic-
itly require finding the hospital negligent. It is quite possible that
the defect occurred during the design or manufacturing process.
Furthermore, the factual circumstances surrounding the handling
and implantation of prosthetic devices by hospitals will not pre-
clude plaintiffs from establishing negligence. The defendant hos-
pital is, increasingly, a local hospital,4" making access to records
and witnesses relatively easy. Finally, hospitals often lack the
substantial control and knowledge of the product4O ' which might
hinder a plaintiff attempting to establish negligence.
The traditional policy justifications for imposing strict liability,
therefore, are of limited effectiveness when applied to the hospi-
tal-patient transaction. Loss spreading is only effective in a large
hospital setting where the particular prosthetic device is used in a
number of operations.42 Neither the resource allocation 43 nor the
probable negligence theories' have much applicability to a hospi-
tal providing implantation services. Finally, the least cost preven-
tion theory45 mandates imposition of a strict liability standard
only if the hospital performs significant product maintenance or
inspection functions.
Most jurisdictions refuse to impose a strict liability standard
on a transaction unless it involves a sale,46 reasoning that the
traditional policy rationales are not applicable to a service trans-
action.47 The critical legal issue, therefore, is whether a hospital
39. Id.
40. Traditionally the implantation of complicated experimental devices is centered in
a few large research hospitals. As the use of the device becomes accepted within the medi-
cal community, the knowledge and technology needed to implant these devices filters down
to the local hospital level.
41. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
46. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 104, at 679-80.
47. See, e.g., Gagne v. Bertraine, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 489, 275 P.2d 15, 20-21 (1954);
Board of Trustees of Union College v. Kennerly, Slomanson & Smith, 167 N.J. Super. 311,
317-18, 400 A.2d 850, 853-54 (Law Div. 1979) (citing City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi,
263 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Minn. 1978). But see Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 468, 256
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should be deemed a seller of products rather than solely a pro-
vider of professional services. This Note will analyze those cases
which involve the sales/service distinction and which are analo-
gous to the situation where a hospital provides implantation serv-
ices involving a defective prosthetic device.
II. HOSPITAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 402A
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts48 is the em-
bodiment of strict products liability case law.49 Section 402A im-
poses strict liability on "sellers," ie., those "engaged in the
business of selling such a product.""0 Although strict products lia-
bility has also been imposed upon persons who provide only com-
mercial services, 5 ' it has not been imposed upon those who
provide professional services. Consequently, it must be deter-
mined whether the transfer of a prosthetic device from hospital to
patient constitutes a sale (to which strict liability or warranties can
apply) or is an inseparable part of the professional medical serv-
ices provided (to which strict liability has not been applied). Since
few courts have faced this issue,52 other hospital product cases will
be analyzed to determine the ultimate analytical approach.
A. Development of the Sales/Service Distinction
Most jurisdictions have consistently held that a sale does not
take place when a hospital provides a product during the rendi-
tion of medical services.5 3 A few recent decisions, however, have
held hospitals strictly liable by finding the existence of sales ele-
ments in the transaction. 4 These latter cases rarely are followed
by other jurisdictions and have stimulated legislative actions limit-
N.W.2d 379, 391 (1977) ("[I]t may be admitted that many of the justifications for strict
liability have force regarding professional medical services.").
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A (1965); see supra notes 5 & 8.
49. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 102, at 657-58.
50. See supra note 8.
51. See Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
52. See Cheshire v. Southampton Hosp. Ass'n, 53 Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531
(Sup. Ct. 1967) (mem.); Cutler v. General Elec. Co., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 300 (Callaghan)
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); Dorfman v. Austenal, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 856 (Callaghan)
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); see also infra notes 104-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of
these cases.
53. See infra notes 56-89 and accompanying text.
54. See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897
(1970); Providence Hosp. v. Truly, 611 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); see also infra
notes 91-102, 118-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
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ing their effectiveness."
1. Majority Rule.- Existence of a Service
In the leading case of Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital,6 the
plaintiff, a hospital patient, contracted hepatitis after receiving a
transfusion of contaminated blood.57 The complaint alleged that
when the hospital supplied the blood, the transaction constituted a
sale58 within the Sales Act.59 The plaintiff argued that since a sale
had occurred, the hospital, in supplying contaminated blood, had
breached the implied warranty of quality.60 The court rejected
55. See infra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
56. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
57. In the typical blood transfusion transaction, the hospital purchases blood from a
blood bank and then provides this blood for patient use. In some instances the blood is
contaminated, thereby causing a possible fatal case of serum hepatitis. This is a similar
situation to when hospitals purchase defective prosthetic devices which cause injury after
implantation. In both circumstances the hospital is playing an intermediate role between
the blood bank or manufacturer and patient.
58. The hospital charged the patient sixty dollars for the blood. 308 N.Y. at 103, 123
N.E.2d at 793.
59. N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 96 (McKinney 1949) (repealed in 1964 by the
Uniform Commercial Code).
60. 308 N.Y. at 103, 123 N.E.2d at 793. Although this case was argued as a breach of
an implied warranty of quality the key issue in this and a products liability action is
whether a sale occurred. Section 15 of the Sales Act provided for an "implied warranty or
condition. . . of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale." Id. The successor to
the Sales Act, the Uniform Commercial Code, now provides greater protection to purchas-
ers. However, the fundamental restriction-the existence of a sale of goods-remains.
Section 2-314 of the U.C.C., covering implied warranties of merchantability, states that:
"Unless excluded or modified. . . a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is im-
plied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind." U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978). In addition, § 2-315, which covers implied warranties of
fitness for a particular purpose, states:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless ex-
cluded or modified. . . an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose.
U.C.C. § 2-315 (1978). In an action for breach of a U.C.C. implied warranty three defenses
may be raised which are not applicable to a strict tort products liability action: (1) that the
plaintiff and defendant were not in privity, U.C.C. § 2-318; (2) that the plaintiff did not
give timely notice of the breach to the defendant, U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a); (3) that defendant
effectively disclaimed such warranties. U.C.C. § 2-316. 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERI-
CAN LAW OF PRODucTs LIABILITY § 4:8 (2d ed. 1974). For a comparison of breach of
warranty and products liability actions, see generally Rapson, Products Liability Under Par-
allel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in
Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 692 (1965); Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and
the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on Judicial Eclifpses, Pigeonholes and Com-
munication Barriers, 17 W. RES. L. REv. 5 (1965); Shanker, A Case ofJudicial Chutzpah
(The Judicial Adoption of Strict Tort Products Liability Theory), 11 AKRON L. REv. 697
(1978); Shanker, A Re-examination of Prosser's Products Liability Crossword Game: The
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this contention; reasoning that the transaction between the plain-
tiff and the hospital was essentially a contract for services and was
not divisible into separate sale and service components.6' The
court stated that "[i]t has long been recognized that, when service
predominates, and transfer of personal property is but an inciden-
tal feature of the transaction, the transaction is not deemed a sale
within the Sales Act."62 The court deemed the supplying of blood
a minor act, subordinate to the hospitars primary function of pro-
viding a trained staff and specialized facilities to restore a patient's
health.63 Finally, the court noted that there existed no means of
detecting or treating those with contaminated blood, thus imply-
ing that it would be inequitable to hold a hospital liable if it was
unable to detect a defect.' 4
Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hospital,65 a leading medical instru-
ment case,66 involved a patient injured when a surgical needle
broke during an operation and lodged in the patient's pelvic
area.6 7 The patient alleged that the hospital was strictly liable be-
cause it was the supplier of a defective product.68 The court
noted, however, that strict liability applies only to defendants who
either play an integral part in production and marketing of the
Strict or Stricter Liability of Commercial Code Sales Warranty, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
550 (1979).
61. Perlmutter, 308 N.Y. at 104, 123 N.E.2d at 794. A minority of New York cases
indicate that the existence of a sale is dependent upon whether the warranty of blood quali-
ty is expressed or implied. See Napoli v. St. Peter's Hosp. of Brooklyn, 213 N.Y.S.2d 6
(1961) (cause of action alleged the existence of an express warranty; Perlmutter, however,
was decided on an implied warranty theory); f. Payton v. Brooklyn Hosp., 21 A.D.2d 898,
252 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1967) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
62. Perlmutter, 308 N.Y. at 104, 123 N.E.2d at 794.
63. Id. at 106, 123 N.E.2d at 795.
64. Id. at 106-07, 123 N.E.2d at 795. The inability to detect a defect, however, is
irrelevant in an implied warranty or products liability action. Absolute liability is imposed
whenever a defect is discovered. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) ("al-
though . . . the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product."); see infra note 97 and accompanying text. But cf. infra notes 154-58 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the unavoidably unsafe product doctrine in which the
seller's ability to detect a defect is a relevant consideration.
65. 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971).
66. Injuries caused by defective medical instruments provides an interesting compari-
son to the defective implanted device problem. Defective medical instruments do not pres-
ent all of the problems encountered by defective prosthetic devices and impure blood or
drugs. Medical instruments are not intended to be implanted or introduced into a patient's
body as are blood, drugs, and prosthetic devices, thus, there is no intended transfer of
personalty from hospital to patient. See supra note 57. The medical instrument cases do,
however, provide valuable insights into the sales/service distinction in medical care.
67. 20 Cal. App. 3d at 1025, 98 Cal. Rptr. 189.
68. Id. at 1026, 98 Cal. Rptr. 190.
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product or who are a link in the chain of distribution from manu-
facturer to consumer. 69 The court observed that the chain of dis-
tribution ended with the hospital, the ultimate user of the
needle.7" Furthermore, the hospital was not in the business of
selling needles, nor did it intend to transfer the needle to the pa-
tient during the rendition of medical services.7
Although the Silverhart case rejects strict liability in the medi-
cal instrument situation, the opinion72 arguably would support
holding the hospital strictly liable when it supplies a defective
prosthetic device. A hospital could easily be considered an inte-
gral part of the marketing of a prosthetic device. Moreover, the
hospital is certainly a link in the chain of distribution from manu-
facturer to consumer. Finally, the chain of distribution of a pros-
thetic device does not end with the hospital. The ultimate
consumer of a prosthetic device is the patient. These factors point
to imposing strict liability under the preliminary Silverhart
analysis.
The Silverhart court, however, relied heavily on Carmichael v.
Reitz,73 which held that strict liability is not applicable to a pre-
scribing doctor whose patient suffered adverse side effects from an
impure drug.74 The Carmichael court reasoned that the physician
was not a product seller but merely provided services utilizing
skill and judgment derived from specialized training and knowl-
69. Id. at 1028, 98 Cal. Rptr. 191.
70. Id.
71. See Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Law Div. 1967), a 'd
sub noma. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1968), a ffd per
curiam 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969) (similar rationale applied to dentists using a defec-
tive instrument in rendering professional services); Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex.
1968) (optometrists). But see Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969)
(beauty operator who provides a routine commercial service is subject to products liability
standard when using defective products). For an interesting variation of the Silverhart
rule, see Anderson v. Somberg, 134 N.J. Super. 1,338 A.2d 35 (App. Div.) aff'd 67 N.J. 291,
338 A.2d 1 (1973) (suit against surgeon, hospital, manufacturer, and supplier of defective
forceps that broke and remained in patient's body after surgery; the court held that the
mere occurrence of accident indicated liability of one or more of the defendants and thus,
shifting the burden of proof to defendants and requiring them to come forward with ex-
planatory and exculpatory evidence).
72. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
73. 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971).
74. Id But cf. Mouran v. Mary Fletcher Hosp., 318 F. Supp. 297 (D. Utah 1970),
(dictum that the U.C.C.'s warranty sections could apply to a hospital which provides anes-
thesia; the court stated that since implied warranties have been extended to sales of new
houses, to be consistent with that rationale, they also should apply to hospitals which pro-
vide anesthesia).
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edge.75 The Carmichael court approvingly quoted Perlmutter v.
Beth David Hospital7 6: "The art of healing frequently calls for a
balancing of risks and dangers to the patient. Consequently, if
injury results from the course adopted where no negligence or
fault is present, liability should not be imposed on [a professional]
seeking to save or otherwise assist the patient."77 Thus, although
Silverhart contains language that could arguably point to strict li-
ability for suppliers of defective prosthetic devices,7 8 that reading
would be conceivable only if the prosthetic devices, unlike medi-
cal instruments used in an operation, were found to have been
"sold."
Three lower court opinions from New York, following Perl-
mutter, specifically address the issue of whether hospitals which
provide defective prosthetic devices are sellers of those products.
In Doffman v. Austenal Inc. ,80 and Cutler v. General Electric Co.,8
warranty principles were held inapplicable to hospitals or physi-
cians because neither sells prosthetic devices. In Dor/man, the
hospital was sued for breaching an implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose82 by implanting a defective surgical pin into a
patient's hip. The court, following Perlmutter, held that the hospi-
tars primary activity was not the selling of surgical pins,83 stating:
"The incidental furnishings of medicines and supplies in the treat-
ment and care of the patient-granted the patient is charged for
them-does not create a separate and additional relationship be-
75. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 979, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 393. The court stated:
[T]here is a difference in status or classification between those upon whom the
courts have heretofore imposed the doctrine ofstrict liability and a physician who
prescribes an ethical drug to achieve a cure of the disorders for which the patient
has sought his professional services. The former act basically as mere conduits to
the distribution of the product to the consumer, the latter sells or furnishes his
services as a healer of illnesses.
Id.; see also Osborn v. Kelley, 61 A.D.2d 367,402 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1978); Batiste v. American
Home Prods. Corp., 32 N.C. App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 466, 233 S.E.2d
921 (1977) (products liability standard not applicable to a doctor who provides drugs to his
patients; doctor was rendering services not selling products).
76. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954). For a discussion of Perlmutter, see supra
notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
77. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 979, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (quoting Perlmutter, 308 N.Y. at 107,
123 N.E.2d at 795).
78. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
79. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954); see supra notes 56-64 and accompanying
text for a discusion of this case.
80. 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 856 (Callaghan) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
81. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 300 (Callaghan) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
82. See supra note 60.
83. 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 857.
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tween them of seller and purchaser for those items."84 The court
in Cutler similarly held that supplying a pacemaker is a secondary
function of the hospital's rendition of medical services and is
therefore not within the provisions of Article II of the Uniform
Commercial Code.85
Cheshire v. Southampton Hospital Association86 acknowledges
that a patient may successfully sue a hospital by showing that a
sale occurred, but the holding offers little additional aid to plain-
tiffs.8 7 The court interpreted Perlmutter not as an outright prohi-
bition on classifying the hospital-patient transaction as a sale but
as indicating the difficulties a patient would encounter in distin-
guishing a sale from the overall transaction for services.88 The
court reasoned that "[slince it may bepossible to prove a sale here
somewhere, as opposed to an overall services contract, we cannot
dismiss the complaint on grounds of presumptive insufficiency."89
Of these three cases, then, Dorfman and Cutler completely reject
sales status for the supplying of prosthetic devices, while Cheshire
holds out only the mere possibility that a plaintiff might establish
a sale.
2. Minority Rule: Existence of a Sale
a. Strict Liability in Tort: Cunningham v. MacNeal Memo-
rial Hospital.90 The Perlmutter rationale was followed throughout
the 1950's and 1960's. 91 In 1970, however, the Illinois Supreme
84. Id.
85. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 301; see also Ruybe v. Gordon, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 889
(Callaghan) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976); Schuchman v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 9 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 637 (Callaghan) (Md. Super. Ct. 1971). In Ruybe a doctor who supplied a defective
intrauterine device was held not liable for breach of an implied warranty of merchantabili-
ty. The court held that U.C.C. § 2-314 attaches neither to a doctor's professional services
nor to surgical or theraputic devices employed incidentally to the treatment. Schuchman
was a blood transfusion case, but the court stated in dictum that a hospital is not a
merchant in a vendor-vendee relationship if it furnishes medical supplies ranging from
"alcohol and aspirin, to Ace bandages, Fleet's enemas, Nembutal, as well as braces, crutch-
es, and canes." 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 647.
86. 53 Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (mem.).
87. Cheshire involved a defective intramedullary pin supplied by a hospital. Id. at
355, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
88. Id. at 356, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
91. Cf. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 95, at 638, § 104 at 679-80. Three cases often
cited as conflicting with Perlmutter, are Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d
115 (Fla. 1967) (complaint charging a blood bank with liability under an implied warranty
for sale of blood to hospital patient did state a cause of action); Jackson v. Muhlenberg
Hosp., 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 5 (1969) (per curiam) (summary judgment denying the use of
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Court in Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital,92 facing a
sales/service issue similar to that in Perlmutter, held that a hospi-
tars liability for contaminated blood could be established under
the strict liability standard expressed in section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts. The Cunningham court reasoned that
human blood was a "product" under section 402A93 the "sale" of
which was distinct from the services provided by the hospital.94
Holding it irrelevant that selling blood was not the hospital's prin-
cipal function, the court stated: "It is not necessary that the seller
be engaged solely in the business of selling such products" for sec-
tion 402A to apply.95 Thus, if the hospital was "within the distri-
bution chain of the product involved,"9 6 a strict products liability
standard would apply.
The Cunningham court rejected every defense asserted by the
hospital. That contaminated blood is impossible to detect was not
dispositive because recognition of this defense would "emasculate
the [strict liability] doctrine and in a very real sense would signal a
return to a negligence theory."97 Moreover, the "unavoidably un-
safe product" doctrine98 was inapplicable because the plaintiff had
alleged that the blood was impure.99 The court reasoned that the
unsafe product doctrine "relates only to products which are not
impure and which, even when properly prepared, inherently in-
volve substantial risk of injury to the user."' 00
Blood, a product not impure or harmful when properly pre-
a products liability standard and an implied warranty action in blood transfusion cases
reversed; trial record was deemed to be inadequate on the issue of holding hospitals liable
under implied warranty or products liability standards for supplying contaminated blood);
Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970) (recovery under implied
warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose may arise from transfer of
blood; decision should rest on technical existence of a sale).
92. 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
93. Id. at 447, 266 N.E.2d at 899.
94. Id. at 451, 266 N.E.2d at 901.
95. Id. at 451, 266 N.E.2d at 901 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
comment f (1965)).
96. Id. at 452, 266 N.E.2d at 901.
97. Id. at 453, 266 N.E.2d at 902. The court noted that a strict liability has been
applied when detection of a defect is impossible, such as in a tin of canned meat, a sealed
candy bar, or in a bottle drink. Id. at 454, 266 N.E.2d at 902 (quoting Community Blood
Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115, 119-20 (Fla. 1967) (Roberts, J., specially
concurring)).
98. See infra notes 165-78 and accompanying text.
99. 47 Ill. 2d at 456, 266 N.E.2d at 904. But cf. Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127 N.J.
Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (App. Div. 1974), afl'dper curiam, 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596
(1975) (products liability inapplicable absent tests to detect contaminated blood).
100. 47 Ill. 2d at 456, 266 N.E.2d at 904.
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pared, is not unavoidably unsafe. 1' Cunningham's reasoning con-
ceivably could hold a hospital strictly liable for supplying
defective prosthetic devices-but that reasoning is faulty. Some
products provided for patient care are clearly separable from the
professional services rendered; 0 2 blood and prosthetic devices
clearly are not. When the hospital provides blood and medical
devices, those products become integrally linked to the profes-
sional judgment, opinion, expertise, and service rendered by phy-
sicians or other trained staff personnel. Provision of prosthetic
devices similarly are linked, and cannot be broken into separate
sales and service elements. Thus, strict liability should not
apply.' 0 3
The result reached in Cunningham contradicted existing legis-
lation in twenty-five states.' °4 After the Cunningham decision,
twenty additional states enacted legislation which statutorily ex-
empts those who provide blood from liability under either implied
warranty or strict tort liability standards. 105 The Illinois legisla-
ture, one of those twenty, 0 6 made an implied warranty or strict
liability standard inapplicable by legislatively mandating that the
furnishing and processing of blood is not a sale. 0 7
The Illinois statute, however, is inapplicable to prosthetic de-
vices. The statute's declaration of public policy was restricted in
scope to the availability of scientific knowledge concerning blood
products, human tissue and other natural organs. 08 This restric-
101. Id.
102. See infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
103. The hospital, of course, can still be held liable for any negligent handling of the
device by its employees.
104. 47 Ill. 2d at 453, 266 N.E.2d at 902.
105. See Wiest, Pricing Bad Blood Reassessing Liabilityfor Post-Transfusion Hepatitis,
15 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 557, 559 (1978).
106. Liability Relating to Use of Human Blood, Organs or Tissue, P.A. 77-184 § 2, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , 5102 § 2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).
The procuring, furnishing, donating, processing, distributing or using human
whole blood, plasma, blood products, blood derivatives and products, corneas,
bones, and organs or other human tissue. . . is declared for purposes of liability
in tort or contract to be the rendition of a service. . . and is declared not to be a
sale of any such items and no warranties of any kind or description nor strict tort
liability shall be applicable ....
Id. The statutes sheltering hospitals from liability under an implied warranty or strict tort
liability standard apply to human organs and blood products but do not encompass artifi-
cial products such as prosthetic devices.
107. Id. The Illinois statute followed most jurisdictions. Thirty-three state legislatures
have declared the procurement of blood for transfusions to be definitionally not a sale.
However, few states exempt blood suppliers from liability because of the suppliers' inabil-
ity to detect and eliminate hepatitis carriers. Wiest, supra note 105, at 588-89.
108. P.A. 77-184 § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , 5101 § i.
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tion indicates the legislature's intent not to eliminate hospital lia-
bility in all situations, but only with respect to the specifically
mentioned products involved. Consequently, the Cunningham
principle of separating the hospital-patient relationship into dis-
tinct sales and service elements still survives.' 0 9
The Cunningham rationale was subsequently applied to a dif-
ferent medical situation in Dubin v. Michael Reese Hospital &
Medical Center."0 The Dubin court held a hospital strictly liable
for supplying and selling x-radiation which subsequently caused
cancer. I1  The appellate court determined that x-radiation is a
product as defined under section 402A" 12 which was unreasonably
dangerous due to inadequate warnings of radiation dangers.'
The court, applying the Cunningham rationale, held that the pa-
tient had stated a cause of action under a strict liability standard
even though supplying x-radiation was ancillary to the hospital's
regular business.' 14
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed Dubin without overruling
or modifying Cunningham. The court instead reasoned that the
dangerous condition was caused by a misapplication of the x-radi-
ation and not by inherent defects in the product. 15 The transac-
tion, therefore, involved an error in professional judgment to
which strict liability does not apply. "6 Since Dubin did not over-
rule Cunningham, Illinois hospitals are still subject to liability
under implied warranty or strict liability standards for selling de-
fective products.
It is possible that if Cunningham is widely adopted as applica-
109. P.A. 77-184 § 4, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I11 , 1 5104 § 4. In initially limiting the
statute's life span to ten years, the legislature may have believed that by 1981, scientific
advancements in detecting blood contaminants would eliminate lawsuits like Cunningham.
Between Cunningham and the planned termination of the Illinois statute in 1981, techno-
logical advances were made: the counterelectrophoresis (CEP) detection test, which is 40%
effective in detecting blood contaminants, was developed in the late 1960's. By early 1973,
however, the radioimmunoassay (RIA) technique was developed which is approximately
80% effective. Elser, Medical Products: An .4rea of Growing Concern, INS. L.J. 539 (1974).
Apparently these technological advances were insufficient to obviate concern, because on
June 19, 1981, the Illinois legislature repealed the automatic repealing provision. P.A. 82-
16, § 1 (1981). Thus, the statutory exemptions are still effective.
110. 74 Ill. App. 3d 932, 393 N.E.2d 588 (1979), rev'd, 83 Ill. 2d 277, 415 N.E.2d 350
(1980).
111. Id. at 945, 393 N.E.2d at 597.
112. Id. at 942, 393 N.E.2d at 595.
113. Id. at 945, 393 N.E.2d at 598.
114. Id. at 944, 393 N.E.2d at 596-97.
115. 83 IlL. 2d 277, 415 N.E.2d 350 (1980).
116. Id. at 280-81, 415 N.E.2d at 352.
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ble to hospital provision of prosthetic devices, state legislatures
would act to exempt hospitals from liability under implied war-
ranty or strict products liability. This result could easily occur
given the contextual similarity between blood and prosthetic de-
vices. Detection of defective prosthetic devices is as difficult today
as was detecting contaminated blood in the late 1960's, since de-
tection of latent defects in the device would be almost impossible
from a pre-operation inspection. 17 Moreover, both products are
often involved in life-saving procedures which promote public
health and welfare. The various legislatures would also have an
incentive to create statutory immunity because the Cunningham
rationale exposes hospitals to extensive liability.
b. Breach of Implied Warranty. Providence Hospital v.
Truly. Providence Hospital v. Truy1'8 supports the imposition of
an implied warranty or strict liability standard on a hospital
which provides a defective prosthetic device. In Truly, a patient
was injured when a contaminated drug from the hospital's phar-
macy was injected into the patient's eye.1 19 The hospital, citing
Perlmutter, argued that the mere supplying of drugs while render-
ing medical service does not constitute a sale under warranty or
strict liability theories.I z° The court held, however, that a sale had
occurred when the patient paid for the drug.' 2 ' The court then
noted that the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness
for a particular purpose-where applicable-inhere in every sale
except those statutorily excepted as medical services.' 22 Implied
warranties attached to this transaction because the statutory ex-
emption was not broad enough to cover drugs.' 23 Under this
analysis, implied warranties would attach to the provision of pros-
thetic devices (which are not exempted statutorily) whenever the
hospital is reimbursed for the cost of those devices. 24
The Truly court's restriction of the medical services immunity
117. See supra note 109.
118. 611 S.W.2d 127 (rex. Civ. App. 1980).
119. Id. at 129.
120. Id. at 132.
121. Id. at 131.
122. Id. at 133. The court noted that the Texas statute only exempted providers of
blood, plasma, and human tissue. Id.
123. Id.
124. Although not discussed, a strict liability action would also be successful, since the
hospital would also be considered a seller under § 402A. In Mueller & Co. v. Corley, 570
S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), the court held both the manufacturer and distributor of
a silicone breast implant strictly liable for the defect. Although the hospital in Corley was
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to only those services specifically enumerated in the statute con-
flicts with the case law of almost all other jurisdictions. 5 Adop-
tion of the Truy rationale would place hospitals on the same level
as retail stores, since they would be liable under either implied
warranty or strict liability theories for every product included on
the patient's bill. This is inequitable treatment; it ignores the es-
sential purpose and function of a hospital. The selection and ad-
ministration of medical products is only one ancillary aspect of
the hospital's primary function-the rendering of medical serv-
ices. A retail store's sole purpose and means of existence is selling
products at a profit, but a hospital, whether it provides medical
products at cost or at a profit, exists primarily to provide services.
This essential difference justifies dissimilar treatment.
B. Abandonment of the Sales/Service Distinction
Throughout this Note, the question of whether to classify the
hospital as a seller of products or as solely a provider of services
has been analyzed. Some jurisdictions,'26 however, hold that the
sales/service distinction is not dispositive of the strict liability
issue.
In Johnson v. Sears Roebuck & Co. ,127 defendants, being sued
for improper installation of a tire, impleaded a hospital under the
theory that the hospital had provided the plaintiff deficient
"mechanical and administrative services."' 128 The court, aban-
doning what it saw as the untenable sales/service dichotomy, 29
examined the underlying policy rationales 30 and found that three
considerations supported strict liability for mechanical and ad-
ministrative services: the potentially serious consequences of de-
fective services, the inability of laymen to control defective
services, and the doctor's need for accurate information when
not joined, a court following the Truly rationale might consider a hospital to be a distribu-
tor of prosthetic devices, and thus, liable under § 402A.
125. See supra notes 56-89 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
127. 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
128. Id. The court does not indicate what mechanical or administrative services were
provided, merely that they were nonprofessional services. Id. at 1067. See infra text ac-
companying notes 133-37 for an example of what the Johnson court would consider a
nonprofessional service.
129. 355 F. Supp. at 1066 (citing Newmark v. Gimbers, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 594, 258 A.2d
697, 700 (1969) (difference between sale and rendition of services is highly artificial); Hoff-
man v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 507, 267 A.2d 867, 870 (1970) (court was not
required to hinge resolution of important issues on the existence of a technical sale)).
130. 355 F. Supp. at 1067; see also supra notes 26-47 and accompanying text.
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treating patients.' 3 ' The court, therefore, held that strict liability
would arise for performance of such services-while emphasizing
that professional medical services could not be subject to strict
liability.' 32
Thomas v. St. Joseph Hospital133 similarly held that a hospital
could be strictly liable for supplying an unreasonably dangerous
hospital gown.' 34 The hospital disclaimed strict liability since it
was not in the business of selling hospital gowns or other medical
products.135 The court held, however, that although only sellers
are usually held strictly liable, lessors and bailors are similarly lia-
ble since they also introduce products into the stream of com-
merce.' 36  Hospitals which supply products unrelated to
professional medical services, therefore, are strictly liable because
they have introduced the product into the stream of commerce.131
Both Johnson and Thomas abandon the sales/service distinc-
tion as it applies to hospitals which supply professional and non-
professional services. Strict liability attaches to nonprofessional
administrative services but not to professional medical services.
Under this analysis, a hospital could be found strictly liable for
supplying defective prosthetic devices only if the devices were pro-
vided as an "administrative" function. The more rational posi-
tion, however, would be to classify the supplying of prosthetic
devices as a professional medical service, since the selection, im-
plantation, and maintenance of the devices requires professional
medical opinions and expertise.
C. Defenses to Strict Liability
If a hospital's liability for supplying a defective prosthetic de-
vice is to be determined under a strict liability standard, then it is
necessary to explore the available defenses. Assumption of risk, 138
131. 355 F. Supp. at 1067.
132. Id. at 1066-67.
133. 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
134. Id. at 798.
135. Id. at 796. It is unclear whether the court considered the hospital a seller or lessor
of gowns. The court constantly stated the gowns were "supplied," although noting that
overhead included the cost of the gowns. See id. at 796-97.
136. Id. (citing Rourke v. Gorza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975) (lessor of unreasonably
dangerous scaffolding held liable under a products liability standard); and Freitas v. Twin
Cities Fisherman's Coop. Ass'n, 452 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (products liability
standard not applicable to lessee of oil tank with unsafe ladder)).
137. Id. at 796-97.
138. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
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product misuse,' 39 and the unavoidably unsafe product doc-
trine'40 are all available defenses in defective prosthetic device
cases. 14 t A consumer's contributory negligence in failing to dis-
cover or guard against product defects, however, has not been ju-
dicially accepted as a defense to strict liability.142  Moreover,
disclaimers of liability, allowable under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 43 are not generally applicable to strict tort liability
claims.' 44 An attempt by a hospital to waive strict tort liability for
sales of a defective prosthetic device, therefore, arguably would be
unenforceable. 45
1. Assumption of Risk
Assumption of risk occurs when one voluntarily and unreason-
ably accepts a known danger. 146 The viability of this defense to
defective prosthetic devices depends upon an examination of the
particular circumstances in each case. This defense is unavailable,
for example, when the patient requires a prosthetic device to sur-
vive or to relieve pain. Under these circumstances, the patient's
choice to have the device implanted is neither voluntary nor un-
reasonable. Furthermore, it is unlikely that every danger of a
complicated prosthetic device could be adequately explained by
the hospital or appreciated by the patient. " The assumption of
139. See infra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
141. Product alteration by the consumer is another traditional defense. However, pa-
tients would not tamper with a prosthetic device prior to installation.
142. 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 60, at 737; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
143. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1978) provides for limited or total waiver of all express or implied
warranties. Any attempt, however, to eliminate the U.C.C. imposed warranties in the case
of injured consumers would be governed by U.C.C. § 2-719(3), which declares prima facie
unconscionable any attempt to limit consequential damages for injury.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states:
The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of the Uniform
Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to warranties; and it is
not affected by limitations on the scope and content of warranties, or by limita-
tions to the "buyer" and "seller" in those statutes.
But see Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974)
(courts have allowed for contractual waiver of products liability protection between busi-
ness entities of equal bargaining strength).
145. If liability disclaimers are enforceable in products liability claims involving pros-
thetic devices, they would be difficult to sustain considering the coercive circumstances
surrounding the medical services provided, including possible emergency surgery. See
Franklin, supra note 26, at 473.
146. 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 60, at 739. A subjective test is applied to
determine voluntariness, unreasonability, and knowledge. Id. at 742.
147. Cf. Comment, The Knowledge Element of.Assumption ofRisk as a Defense to Strict
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risk defense, however, may be viable when the procedure under-
taken is a nonessential, elective operation using a relatively simple
prosthetic device. A voluntary and informed choice is more likely
in that situation, since medical treatment is presumably possible
without utilizing a prosthetic device. The assumption of risk de-
fense, therefore, has limited applicability to defective prosthetic
devices since voluntary, reasonable, and informed choices cannot
occur except in restricted circumstances.
2. Misuse of Product
A seller is not liable if the product is used for an unintended
purpose unforeseeable to the seller.' 48 In Stewart v. Von Solbrig
Hospital, Inc.,'49 a defective, hospital-manufactured surgical pin
was implanted into the patient's tibia. 5 ' The pin was designed
merely to align the leg fracture, not for skeletal support.' 5 ' Con-
trary to the doctor's express direction, however, the plaintiff
walked on his leg and broke the pin. 52 The court held that al-
though the pin was defective, the plaintiffis misuse precluded ap-
plication of strict liability, since walking would cause even a
nondefective pin to fail. 5 ' The product misuse defense, therefore,
may be available if the patient uses the device for an unintended
purpose unforeseeable to the seller.
3. The Unavoidably Unsafe Product
A hospital or manufacturer can avoid the imposition of strict
liability if the prosthetic device is unavoidably unsafe.'54 The un-
avoidably unsafe product is not considered defective or unreason-
ably dangerous and therefore, may exempt the seller from
liability."' Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts de-
Products Liability, 10 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 243 (1977) (assumption of risk defense
should not be permitted in products liability cases unless plaintiff is substantially aware of
both the gravity of the harm and the probability of its occurrence).
148. 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 60, at 754-58; W. PROSSER, supra note 2,
§ 102, at 668-69.
149. 24 111. App. 3d 599, 321 N.E.2d 428 (1974).
150. Id. at 600, 321 N.E.2d at 429.
151. Id. at 601-02, 321 N.E.2d at 430.
152. Id. at 602, 321 N.E.2d at 431.
153. Id. at 604, 321 N.E.2d at 432.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965).
155. A product can be classified as unavoidably unsafe and still be defective. Strict
liability will be invoked if the product is defectively constructed, prepared, or without ade-
quate warnings. Comment k of § 402A states:
The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly
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fines an unavoidably unsafe product as one which, given present
human knowledge, is "incapable of being made safe for [its] in-
tended and ordinary use." '56 This section has been applied to drug
and vaccine products'57 because the public benefits outweigh the
medical risks. A product's unavoidably unsafe status, however, is
subject to change as knowledge, skill, and technology increase. 58
If technological developments refine the product sufficiently, the
unavoidably unsafe label should be dropped. The unavoidably
unsafe doctrine, therefore, should apply only to those properly
prepared and labeled devices which still cannot be made com-
pletely safe, but whose benefits outweigh their risks.
Classifying a prosthetic device as unavoidably unsafe depends
upon its intended use and complexity. A device used in critical
situations where the patient's life is threatened could be classified
as unavoidably unsafe because the device's benefits outweigh its
possible detriments. However, a device that is easily designed and
manufactured-a surgical pin or artificial joint-would not be
classified as unavoidably unsafe. These products can be safely
designed, and the benefits of the products do not justify unavoid-
ably high probabilities of harm.
D. Conclusion
Although strict products liability is applicable to an increasing
number of transactions, t59 it has yet to be imposed on professional
medical services or to products provided by hospitals or physi-
cians. Hospitals and physicians may be held strictly liable for
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for
it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their
use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable
risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965); see also, eg., Davis v. Wy-
eth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968) (Sabin polio vaccine was an un-
avoidably unsafe product, but unreasonably dangerous from inadequate warnings).
156. Id.
157. Id. The example given in comment k is the Pasteur treatment for rabies.
158. The Illinois legislature, for example, declared blood an unavoidably unsafe prod-
uct because there was no adequate test for detecting impure human blood when the statute
was enacted. See supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text. The legislators weighed the
benefits and detriments of blood products and concluded: "The imposition of legal liabil-
ity without fault upon the persons and organizations engaged in such scientific procedures
inhibits the exercise of sound medical judgment and restricts the availability of important
scientific knowledge, skills and materials."
159. See supra note 3.
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products 60 and services16' unrelated to professional medical serv-
ices. The majority of cases, 62 however, advocate immunity from
strict liability for products and services integrally related to pro-
fessional medical expertise. In most jurisdictions, prosthetic im-
plants would be considered integrally linked to medical services,
thus, precluding strict liability. 163
III. THE MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT
The Department of Commerce published the Model Uniform
Product Liability Act (UPLA) t64 as an attempt to eliminate the
contradictions 65 and uncertainties 66 in products liability cases.
The UPLA has not been enacted by any state, but its provisions
are used by states to guide promulgation of their own codes.
Under the UPLA, a hospital providing a defective prosthetic de-
vice will not be subject to strict tort liability.
The UPLA defines a product seller as "any person or entity
that is engaged in the business of selling products" including a
manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, or retailer. 67 Professionals
160. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 56-89 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text for cases involving hospital liability
and medical implants. These cases, however, were breach of warranty actions.
164. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY AT, 44 Fed Reg. 62,714 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as UPLA].
165. The Model law, if enacted by the states, would introduce uniformity and sta-
bility into the law of product liability....
The current system of having individual state courts develop product liability
law on a case-by-case basis is not consistent with commercial necessity. Product
sellers and insurers need uniformity in product liability law so they will know the
rules by which they are judged. At the same time, product users are entitled to
the assurance that their rights will be protected and will not be restricted by "re-
form" legislation formulated in a crisis atmosphere. Thus, the Model Law meets
the needs of product users, sellers and insurers.
Id. Introduction.
166. The criteria utilized in evaluating the provisions of the UPLA were:
(6) To use language that is comparatively clear and concise. Many product liability
proposals that appear sound when stated in a broad and general manner break
down when one focuses on the practicality of their implementation. In drafting
the Act, practicality, together with conciseness and clarity of language, were im-
portant goals. The Act was drafted as a guideline for courts, not as a detailed
legal contract between product seller and user.
Id. (emphasis in original).
167. (A) Product Seller. "Product seller" means any person or entity that is en-
gaged in the business of selling products, whether the sale is for resale, or for use
or consumption. The term includes a manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, or
retailer of the relevant product. The term also includes a party who is in the
business of leasing or bailing such products.
Id. § 102(A).
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who use, provide, or sell products within the legally authorized
scope of their practice, however, are expressly excluded from this
definition.168 The UPLA notes that absent any product prepara-
tion or modification, the courts generally have not applied prod-
ucts liability doctrines to professional judgments.'69 The UPLA's
official analysis states that professionals, such as pharmacists, phy-
sicians, optometrists, and opticians should not be considered prod-
uct sellers; nor should such professionals working within the scope
of their employment. 70
Although hospitals are not expressly mentioned in the official
analysis, they are arguably within the product seller exclusion.
The drafters' intent was to exclude all parties exercising profes-
sional judgment or skills. 17' This conclusion is supported by the
drafters' findings which suggest that the imposition of strict liabil-
ity creates serious "disincentives for innovation and for the devel-
opment of high-risk but potentially beneficial products."'' 72
Imposing strict liability on hospitals for defective prosthetic de-
vices would discourage hospitals from using the devices, thus cur-
tailing their development. Hospitals, therefore, likely would fall
within the product seller exclusion.
Even if hospitals are considered product sellers of prosthetic
devices, several UPLA provisions would prevent imposition of
168. "The term 'product seller' does not include. . . [a] provider of professional serv-
ices who utilizes or sells products within the legally authorized scope of its professional
practice." Id. § 102(A)(2).
169. The majority of current decisions look to the factual circumstances of each case
and generally exclude persons exercising professional judgment within their legally author-
ized scope of practice. Thus, in the absence of product preparation or modification, or any
representation by service providers that the products are their own, or of warranty, the
courts have generally not applied products liability doctrine." Id. § 102(A) (Analysis).
170. The UPLA provides:
[P]rofessionals, such as pharmacists, physicians, optometrists and opticians,
should not be considered product sellers in those circumstances where they are
selling a product while within their legally authorized scope of professional prac-
tice. In addition, pharmacists or other professionals, employed by and working
within the scope of their employment for a hospital or other health-related facil-
ity, would not be considered product sellers within this context since they would
be rendering a part of the overall services of such facilities.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Such professionals, however, are considered
product sellers when "the sale of a product is the principal part of the transaction and when
the essence of the relationship between buyer and seller is not the furnishing of a profes-
sional skill or service." Id. (emphasis in original). A pharmacist selling perfume or
photographic film is given as an example in which the professional is considered a product
seller. Id.
171. The drafters noted that the vast majority of cases involving professional skill or
judgment are not resolved by resort to a strict liability standard. Id. See supra note 155.
172. UPLA § 101.
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strict liability. Section 105(A) states that nonmanufacturing prod-
uct sellers are liable only for negligence.17 3 Since a hospital is
often a nonmanufacturer, it would be liable only for its negli-
gence' 74-the very standard currently imposed on hospitals in
most jurisdictions. A hospital would be subject to strict liability
only if it expressly warrants a material fact concerning the prod-
uct; 75 or where the manufacturer is not subject to service of pro-
cess, is insolvent, or is judgment proof.176  If the hospital were
considered a product seller, 7 7 strict liability would be imposed
173. A product seller, other than a manufacturer, is subject to liability to a claim-
ant who provides by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant's harm
was proximately caused by such product seller's failure to use reasonable care
with respect to the product....
Unless Subsection (B) or (C) is applicable, product sellers shall not be subject
to liability in circumstances in which they did not have a reasonable opportunity
to inspect the product in a manner which would or should, in the exercise of
reasonable care, reveal the existence of the defective condition.
Id. § 105(A).
174. In determining whether a product seller other than a manufacturer, is subject to
liability under Subsection (A), the trier of fact:
shall consider the effect of such product seller's own conduct with respect to the
design, construction, inspection, or condition of the product, and any failure of
such product seller to transmit adequate warnings or instructions about the dan-
gers and proper use of the product.
Id.
175. A product seller, other than a manufacturer, who makes an express warranty
about a material fact or facts concerning a product is subject to the standards of
liability set forth in Subsection 104(D).
Id. § 105(B).
In order to determine that the product was unreasonably unsafe because it did
not conform to an express warranty, the trier of fact must find that the claimant,
or one acting on the claimant's behalf, relief on an express warranty made by the
manufacturer or its agent about a material fact or facts concerning the product
and the express warranty proved to be untrue.
A "material fact" is any specific characteristic or quality of the product. It
does not include a general opinion about, or praise of, the product.
The product seller may be subject to liability under Subsection (D) although it
did not engage in negligent or fraudulent conduct in making the express
warranty.
Id. § 104(D).
176. A product seller, other than a manufacturer, is also subject to the liability of a
manufacturer. . . if:
(1) The manufacturer is not subject to service of process under the laws of the
claimant's domicile; or
(2) The manufacturer has been judicially declared insolvent in that the manu-
facturer is unable to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course of
business; or
(3) The court determines that it is highly probable that the claimant would be
unable to enforce a judgment against the product manufacturer.
Id. § 105(C); see also generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 64, at 301-04 (3d ed. 1976) (discussion of in personam jurisdiction over nonresident
corporations).
177. The product manufacturer is held liable for construction defects, UPLA § 104(A),
and failure to conform to express warranties, id. § 104(D); and is held to a negligence
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only under limited circumstances. 78
IV. CONCLUSION
Analysis of the traditional policy rationales for imposing strict
liability 79 reveals that only the loss spreading theory applies to
hospitals supplying defective prosthetic devices. °80 Even this jus-
tification is weakened when applied to small hospitals supplying
an insignificant number of prosthetic implants.1 8 ' The key issue in
determining the imposition of strict products liability is whether
the hospital is a seller of products. 8 2 Since there are few reported
cases involving defective prosthetic devices, 83 it is necessary to
examine other hospital product cases and analogize them to po-
tential prosthetic devices cases.
Courts gradually have expanded the strict liability doctrine be-
yond transactions involving the mere sale of products; 184 never-
theless, section 402A has been generally held inapplicable to
professional medical services. The courts consider a hospital as
primarily providing medical services, with the transfer of goods in
the hospital-patient relationship as merely ancillary to this pri-
mary function.' 85 Those few jurisdictions which treat a hospital
as a seller or retailer of products 8 6 are clearly in error. A hospital
is essentially a service oriented facility which supplies products
only incidentally, whereas a retailer's primary activity is selling.
Some jurisdictions have abandoned the sales/service distinction,
recognizing that hospitals primarily provide services, but they
classify these services as either professional or administrative.
87
If the defective product is associated with an administrative serv-
ice, these jurisdictions conclude that basic policy considerations
standard for design defects, id. § 104(B)(1), and defects from inadequate warnings. Id. §
104(C)(3)-(5). The UPLA's primary purpose is to assure adequate compensation for those
injured by unreasonably unsafe products. Id. Preamble. The UPLA guarantees recovery
by imposing a products liability standard on the wholesaler and retailer if the manufac-
turer cannot be sued.
178. Furthermore, the hospital could assert the products liability defense doctrines of
assumption of risk, id. § 112(B), misuse, id. § 112(C), product alteration, id. § 112(D), and
the unavoidably dangerous product. Id. § 106.
179. See supra notes 16-51 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 3, 49-64 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 56-89 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 91-125 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
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justify imposition of liability. Under either analysis, however, the
hospital should not be held strictly liable because the selection,
implantation, and maintenance of prosthetic devices involve pro-
fessional medical services and judgment rather than administra-
tive conduct. Finally, if a hospital were to be held liable, the
defense doctrines of assumption of risk, 8' product misuse, 8 9 and
unavoidably unsafe product'9 ° would be available. Their availa-
bility varies with the complexity and intended use of the device.
In addition, the Model Uniform Product Liability Act' 9'
would exempt hospitals from strict liability. The UPLA appar-
ently prohibits strict liability when professional judgment and
skill are a necessary element of the transaction, and only holds
such professionals liable for negligence. Under the UPLA, the in-
jured patient has recourse against the hospital for negligence and
is compensated by the manufacturer through strict liability for de-
vice defects. In the interest of lower medical costs brought about
by reduced insurance expenses and damage claims, the UPLA of-
fers the best solution.
ROBERT J. DREXLER, JR.
188. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 165-78 and accompanying text.
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